Capitalism, the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court by Willis, Hugh Evander
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 3 Article 1
1934
Capitalism, the United States Constitution and the
Supreme Court
Hugh Evander Willis
Indiana University
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Willis, Hugh Evander (1934) "Capitalism, the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 22 : Iss.
3 , Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol22/iss3/1
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
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CAPITALISM, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE SUPREME COURT
By HUGH EVAM WmLIS*
The nineteenth century, which roughly corresponds to the
period of maturity of Anglo-American law, was chiefly noted for
the protection of property and contract, the growth, especially
in the United States, of the corporate form of business organiza-
tion, and the final development of the capitalistic system. This
century, also, was the great century of constitutional ddvelop-
ment in the United States. An interesting question for legal
study is whether or not these two developments have merely
been concurrent, or wbether there has been some relation be-
tween them.
CAPITLSM
Capitalism has been defined as a system of free, individual-
istic enterprise which allows and fortifies the accumulation of
wealth.1 It is an economic system based on competition for pri-
vate profit. This definition is perhaps not quite accurate as
applied to that form of capitalism which has been developed by
the modern form of corporate organization, but it is a good
general definition of historical capitalism. The chief charac-
teristics of capitalism hAve been the following, and the first four
are named in the order of their historical origin: (1) Private
property; (2) Contract and freedom of contract; (3) Indus-
*A. B. 1897, M. A. 1899, LL. D. 1925, Yankton College; LL. B. 1901,
LL. M. 1902, University of Minnesota. Professor of Law, Indiana Uni-
versity. Author of Principles of Law of Contracts, Principles of Law
of Damages, Law of Social Justice, Introduction to Anglo-American
Law.
1 Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 Yale
Law Jour. 668, 678.
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trialism, including the factory, the machine, mass production,
the city, and the integration of the labor class; (4) Business,
including the corporation, credit structure, investment banking,
and marketing; (5) The profit motive; and (6) Individualism,
including freedom to choose any business or profession, freedom
to run such business or profession without social interference,
freedom of competition, and freedom to keep any advantages
acquired. However, it should be noted that the third and fourth
characteristics are not necessarily peculiar to capitalism. They
might also characterize other systems.
Capitalism has not been a static, but a growing, changing
thing. In the United States, it may be divided into four main
periods: (a) The pre-industrial, or agricultural period, prior
to 1840; (b) The corporate industrial period, from 1840 to
1880; (c) The period of corporate monopoly, from 1880 to the
time of the World War; and (d) The period of corporate fi-
nance, from the time of the World War up to date. The first
period was characterized by its emphasis of property and con-
tract. The second period still emphasized these things, and in
this period there had not as yet developed a property-less class;
but the second period did witness the emergence of a labor class.
The third period was characterized by the emergence of various
business classes and an inner cleavage among them, and the
growth of the modern trusts. The fourth period was character-
ized by the separation of ownership from management, the ap-
pearance of banking control of industry, and the dominance of
the promoter.
The modern corporation is a major social institution. One
corporation is likely to be large enough to be an economic em-
pire. All of the corporations together are as embracing as the
feudal system. The corporation has powerful relations with
workers and production, with customers and with the govern-
ment itself. The corporation is a device which has accomplished
three purposes. The first and earliest purpose was to provide
a means through which the private business transactions of indi-
viduals could be carried on. The second purpose was to pro-
vide a method of property tenure. With the advent of quasi-
public corporations the unity of ownership and power which
formerly was called property was destroyed. This was not a
necessary incident of the corporation but it has been a chief
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characteristic. It was brought about by the multiplication of
owners through the public market for securities and the use of
the proxy and other devices by those seeking power. The third
purpose of the corporation is the recent one of organizing our
economic life through the mobilization of property interests, the
concentration of wealth, the surrender of control by the inves-
tors and the power acquired by the directors of industry.
The concentration of economic power in the United States
is only equalled by the concentration of political power in our
national state. But we have not as yet subjected the first to the
same test of public benefit to which we have subjected the second.
In 1930 two hundred non-banking corporations controlled forty-
nine per cent of the corporate wealth other than banking, thirty-
eight per cent of the business wealth other than banking and
twenty-two per cent of all wealth. The interests of these cor-
porations are so diversified that every individual comes into con-
tact with them either as shareholder, employee or consumer. The
growth of th.e large corporations has been the most rapid. If the
recent growth should continue, by 1950 seventy to eighty-five
per cent of all corporate activity would be controlled by two
hundred corporations. The means whereby large dorporations
are acquiring this concentration of economic povwer are the rein-
vesting of earnings and the sales of securities to the investing
public and mergers. These huge corporations dominate our
major industries, and have the power to control production and
set aside the blind economic forces on which people have been
led to believe they could depend.
The dispersion of stock ownership has been a recent phe-
nomenon and a continuing process. In the largest railroad
(the Pennsylvania) the largest public utility (the A. T. & T.)
and the largest industry (United States Steel) the principal
owner now owns less than one per cent of the outstanding stock.
When this result is reached the ownership may be called public
ownership. The dispersion of stock ownership is progressing
among corporations of medium size. Often the largest owner
of stock is a second corporation whose stock is widely owned as
in the case of the Electric Bond and Share Company. This re-
sult was brought to pass largely through the encouragement, of
employee owners and customer owners. The corporation turned
to these classes at one time because of federal taxes. Now that
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federal taxes have been lowered, coiporations are perhaps not
pushing this form of ownership so much. In 1927, forty-five per
cent of corporate stock was owned by people of moderate means.
Recently, one-half of the savings of the community have gone
into corporate securities. No other fields axe likely to supplant
this field. Real estate and foreign loans do not threaten serious
competition. Hence, it is a safe guess that the dispersion of
stock ownership will continue as soon as people begin again to
save and tbat they will invest either directly or indirectly in the
stock of insurance companies, banks and trust companies. The
depersonalization of ownership has become so mobile that a cor-
poration seems to have an independent life as if it belonged to
no one.2
T E CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREmE COURT
Law is a scheme of social control established in the United
States by the people as a whole for the purpose of creating a bet-
ter social order, either of social happiness or racial perfection,
through the delimitation of personal liberty for the protection
of social interests.
Constitutions are fundamental law setting up the frame-
work of government to exercise the social control called law,
delegating to the branches of government the powers to be exer-
cised by them and placing limitations on such exercise of powers
to protect personal liberty against more social control than it
is thought ought to be exercised.
The United States Supreme Court has not only itself cre-
ated the larger part of our Constitution, but has taken to itself
as a part of its judicial power the function of making the fed-
eral Constitution accomplish the purpose of its establishment.
Capitalism is a form of economic personal liberty and,
therefore, so long as we have social control, should, like any
other form of personal liberty, be subject to social control if
social control rather than personal liberty would be better for
our social order.
What has been the relation between capitalism and the Con-
stitution? Under our fundamental law, has social control been
2 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Pro perty.
The figures on corporations given herein are taken from Berle and
Means' Book.
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applied to capitalism or has'capitalism been free from social
control? Has capitalism changed and developed with or with-
out direction by the Supreme Court? Has the Supreme Court,
in other words, refrained from interfering with or co-operated
with, or found itself unable to cope with corporations? What
has been the attitude of the Supreme Court toward such charac-
teristics of capitalism as private property, freedom of contract,
individualism and the profit motive? Whatever the Supreme
Court has done or has not done, has it pursued the right course,
or should it have pursued a different course? What is likelyt
to be the course of the Supreme Court in the future?
ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
The original Constitution of the United States, as it was
drafted in the Constitutional Convention, apparently had as
some of its main objects the protection of private property and
contract and the securing of individual liberty. That one of its
objects was the protection of private property and contract is
shown by the provision in Article VI that "All debts contracted,
and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Con-
stitution, shall be as valid against the United States, under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation"; by the provision in
Section 2 of Article IV that "No person held to service or labor
in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such, service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor may be due"; by the
provision in Section 8 of Article I that Congress shall have the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes"; by the provi-
sion in Section 9 of Article I that "The migration or importa-
tion of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the year 1808"; and by the provision in Section 10 of Ar-
ticle I that no state shall "make anything but gold and silver
coin a tender in payment of debts," or pass any "law impair-
ing the obligation of contracts," or "without the consent of
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
laws." That another one of its objects was the protection of per-
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sonal liberty is shown by the provision in Section 2 of Article IV
that "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states"; and by the
nature of the framework of government set up by the Consti-
tution. This Constitution set up both a dual form of govern-
ment and a separation of the federal government into three dif-
ferent branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.
Not content with this separation of powers, the drafters of the
Constitution gave to each one of the branches of government
some of the powers which would appropriately belong to the
other branches of government, so that each one would be a check
on the other; and not content with this, it set up two branches
for the legislative branch of government, so that whatever one
body of men undertook to do, the other body could prevent it
from doing. The effect of this form of government, it has been
said, was to "guarantee to a whole nation that they never could
be governed at all. And that is exactly what they wanted."
Undoubtedly, at the time of the drafting of our original Con-
stitution, there was a great deal of fear of government and a
great deal of love of liberty and property; and the drafters of
that document thought that one of the best protections of liberty
and property was to so hamstring the government that it could
not interfere with liberty and property. In the original Consti-
tion, for the most part, this was not done by constitutional
guaranties and limitations, but by the scheme of checks and bal-
ances set up therein. However, this protection of liberty did not
seem to be enough for the patriots of our early day. Evidently,
they feared that the government might, in some way, break the
strings by which it was bound, and, therefore, almost immedi-
ately, a great many other constitutional limitations and guar-
anties were introduced in the form of amendments to the orig-
inal Constitution for the purpose of protecting personal liberty
and property. These limitations were not based upon any th.eory
of natural law, as the Declaration of Independence was, and as
some later decisions of the United States Supreme Court came
very close to being, but upon the theory that the sovereign
people were protecting themselves against the usurpation of
power by the various agents and agencies which they had set up.
The result of such a scheme for the protection of personal liberty
against imaginary political dictators was that, in the course of
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time, instead even of protecting personal liberty, it developed a
state of society in which various people like the ward healer
and the financier clothed with constitutional protection became
the worst sort of dictators without responsibility.
While personal liberty and property and contract received
great protection under the original Constitution and the first
amendments thereto, the protection thus afforded was negative
in character rather than positive. It kept government from in-
terfering with capitalistic development, but it did not actively
co-operate with capitalism to aid its development.
SUPREME COURT
Mlost of our United States Constitution, as we strangely are
only recently beginning to realize, has been made by the United
States Supreme Court, either by interpreting provisions written
into the original Constitution, or by the development and addi-
tion of new constitutional doctrines. So far as concerns our capi-
talistic system, the United States Supreme Court in its work
has not been merely negative, it has given some creative, positive
direction to it. There has been a great deal of criticism of our
courts for their legal lag, and it has been said that even the
United States Supreme Court has failed to adjust itself to eco-
nomic growth. There is only a half truth in this. The other half
of the truth is that law is as much a growth as economics. Some-
times this growth, is concealed by fictions, but even fictions are
vehicles of change. Of course, some constitutional development
has been the result of the impact of capitalistic development.
Capitalism has both posed problems for the Supreme Court and
has conditioned the answers. It has pushed before the Supreme
Court the various clashes of interest, like those between em-
ployees and employers, between various groups of business men,
between tb.e consumers and public utility groups, between the
agricultural and the industrial groups, between ownership and
control groups, within the corporate structure itself, between
autonomous business control and state enforced competition, be-
tween individual enterprise and collective control, and between
property interests and human interests. But the Supreme Court
in deciding the issues between the varying clashing groups of the
capitalistic system, has been more than a mere spokesman for
capitalism; it has given positive direction to many of the things
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found in the capitalistic system. The growth of each has been
interwoven with and conditioned by the other. Constitutional
law is best understood when it is read in the light of capitalism,
and capitalism is best understood when it is read in the light
of constitutional law.
The Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, has
been an agency of social control. The social control which, it has
established has been due somewhat to the economic views of the
judges, but more to the fact that the judges are members of our
social order and a social product. The decisions of the judges, of
course, are influenced by the legal technic or rhetoric which they
use and to the personal differences which they have, but they
are due more to the capitalistic system and the world of ideas in
which the judges live. Hence, if there is a desire to change the
decisions of the Supreme Court, the best way to do so would be
to change the current ideologies. To this extent, the Supreme
Court has only registered its approval of the work of capitalism.
But the Supreme Court has been more than this. It has been
more than an arbiter between the' states and the federal govern-
ment and between the various branches of the federal govern-
ment. It has been an arbiter between the various economic
forces. In the Dred Scott decision 3 it tried a little too early to
give direction to economic forces and failed, but later became
the modus operandi of business. Where it desired, it checked
the forces opposed to capitalistic expansion; and where it de-
sired, it checked the forces of capitalistic expansion. It has had
economic affiliations and has been creative more than submissive.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
The first work of the Supreme Court with reference to our
capitalistic system was in connection with the protection under
the obligation of contract clause in the United States Consti-
tution. This occurred in the period of Chief Justice Marshall,
and thereafter was gradually stopped, but there is some indica-
tion of a recent revival of this protection.4 This protection of
property and contract took the form of a limitation on the power
of the states. It was a tradition holding over from the Con-
stitutional Convention. It was a part of the Federalist faith.
*Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), 19 How. 393.
C*oolidge v. Long (1931), 282 U. S. 582.
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As a consequence, the protection of private rights and the de-
velopment of federal power were more than two concurrent
phenomena. There was a relation between them. The Federal-
ists had the notion that state legislatures were dangerous. In
this period, however, private property was not on the defensive.
The frontier exalted property. The Jacksonian Revolution did
not have as its purpose the overthrow of property, and the
federal judges increasingly conscripted Jefferson's ideology of
a natural law to protect property and to limit the state legis-
latures.
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck,5 the Supreme Court, under
the contract clause, protected land titles against the action of a
state to avoid them for fraud, by holding that the protection of
the Constitution included grants or executed contracts as well
as executory contracts, in spite of the fact that the Constitution
forbids only the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
But the greatest use of the contract clause was in connec-
tion with the protection of the charters of private corporations.
This protection was first extended in the celebrated Dartmouth
College case.6 In this case, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by the great Chief Justice Marshall, held that a charter
of a charitable corporation was not only a contract rather than
o mere repealable act of a legislature, but that as a contract it
was free from the exercise by the state government of the great
police power, the power of taxation, and perhaps even the power
of eminent domain which had been delegated to the legislatures
as agents of the people. The doctrine of this case was soon ex-
tended to private business corporations. 7 This rule gave private
corporations greater protection than had ever been given to pri-
vate contracts which had always been held to be subject to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, the power of taxa-
tion, and the police power.8 Of course, the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court protected all contracts, but the
doctrine of the Dartmouth College case protected corporations
to a greater extent than it protected private persons. The re-
(1810), 6 Cranch 87.
6 (1819), 4 Wheat. 518.
7Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. (1864), 1 Wall. 116; Piqua
Bank v. Knoop (1853), 16 How. 369.
8 Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113; Manigault v. Springs (1905),
199 U. S. 473.
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sult of this was the practical protection of private corporations
against political action by the states for fifty years. This had
much to do with the amazing development of corporations in the
United States and the resulting corporate civilization which has
come to pass. It gave corporations such an advantage that
gradually corporate ownership succeeded private individual
ownership; corporate management of business succeeded private
management; the ownership of corporate stock gradually became
more and more scattered until at last corporate ownership and
corporate management were separated; and along with this de-
velopment there grew up all sorts of corporate abuses. Pro-
moters and financiers took advantage of the protection of the
contract clause not only to aggrandize the corporation, but for
the aggrandizement of certain favored individuals inside of the
corporation.
The protection given to corporations by the Dartmouth Col-
lege case and the cases following it was evidently a little too
much for the country in that stage of its development, and va-
rious efforts were made to limit the scope of the doctrine.
The first limitation on the doctrine of the Dartmouth Col-
lege case was that made by the rule of strict construction. This
rule was introduced by Chief Justice Taney in the case of
Charles River Bridge v. W9arren Bridge,9 and it was followed by
a number of subsequent cases.' 0 By the rule of strict construc-
tion, the states were allowed to do a great many things without
violating the charter granted to a corporation. In the Charles
River Bridge case, for example, the state of Massachusetts was
allowed to incorporate a second bridge company to build a free
bridge (after six years) within a few rods from a bridge built
by a corporation which had previously been incorporated to
build a toll bridge across the Charles River for forty years, on
the theory that strictly construed the first charter did not give
it an exclusive franchise. Of course, the rule of strict construc-
tion did not avail a state where a corporate charter was care-
fully dawn, and thereafter corporations were more careful to
see that their charters were more carefully drawn.
The second limitation put upon the Dartmouth College case
" (1837), 11 Pet. 420.
20 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1878), 97 U. S. 659; Stein v. Bien-
vflle Water Co. (1891), 141 U. S. 67; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville
(1906), 200 U. S. 22.
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was by the reservation incorporated in constitutions and general
laws of the power to alter or repeal charters. The Supreme
Court held that, where there was such provisions in constitutions
or general statutes, they became terms in the contract and, there-
fore, subsequent legislation or repeal, did not impair the obliga-
tion of a contract. 11 However, not all the states had such pro-
visions, and, of course, such provisions would only apply to sub-
sequently incorporated corporations.
The third limitation on the Dartmouth College decision was
made by the Supreme Court itself. Dissenting judges had
always contended that a state could not legally abrogate the sov-
ereign powers of eminent domain, taxation, and police power.12
A majority of the Supreme Court finally held that the power of
eminent domain could not be bartered away and that all char-
ters were subject to the exercise of this power.1 3 A little later,
after the personnel of the bench had been changed and the dis-
senting Justice Miller had been joined by Chief Justice Waite,
Justice Harlan and others who agreed with him, the court held
in a series of difficult cases which came before it that charters
were subject to the exercise of the police power, first, as to
public morals,14 then as to public health,15 then as to public
safety,' and finally, as to economic social interest.' 7 This meant
that contracts were subject to the exercise of the police power,
except in the case of the rates of public utilities and franchises
of public utilities.'8 As yet, the Supreme Court has not made
the contracts of corporations subject to the power of taxation. 19
n Greenwood v. Freight Co. (1882), 105 U. S. 13.
" Washington University v. Rouse (1869), 8 Wall. 439; Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. 518; Piqua Bank v.
Knoop (1853), 16 How. 369.
11 West River Bridge 'Co. v. Dix (1848), 6 How. 507.
1 Stone v. Mississippi (1880), 101 U. S. 814.
"Butchers, etc., Co. v. Crescent City Co. (1884), 111 U. S. 746.
11 Texas, etc., Co. v. Miller (1911), 221 U. S. 408; New Orleans v.
Louisiana Light Co. (1885), 115 U. S. 650.
"'Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1892), 146 U. S. 387.
uDetroit v. Detroit Citizens Ry. (1902), 184 U. S. 368; Cleveland
v. Cleveland City Ry. (1904), 194 U. S. 517; Vicksburg v. Vi 'ksburg
Water Works Co. (1907), 206 U. S. 496; Columbus, etc., Co. v. Columbus
(1919), 249 U. S. 399.
19Lake Superior, etc, Mines v. Lord (1926), 271 U. S. 577; Roberts,
etc., Co. v. Emmerson (1926), 271 U. S. 50; Millsaps College v. Jackson
(1927), 275 U. S. 129. But a state can acquire the power to tax a cor-
poration by requiring the relinquishment of constitutional protection
as a condition of granting a privilege, or, where there has been a
K. L._2
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Except for taxation and te franchises and the rates of
public utility companies, the Supreme Court has now ceased
to give corporations any protection which it does not extend
to natural persons, but it still protects both corporations and
natural persons against any impairment of the obligation of
their contracts not rationalized as an exercise of the police power
or the power of taxation or the power of eminent domain. With
the development of other clauses in the United States Constitu-
tion, the contract clause began somewhat to wane after the
Civil War, although, as we have already indicated, there is some
evidence that it is about to have another revival.
Protection of freedom of contract as distinguished from
protection against the impairment of the obligation of a contract
was not given people in the United States under the contract
clause, although this consummation almost came to pass. In
the case of Sturges v. Crowninshielk2 ° the court held a prior
contract was protected against a subsequent state insolvency law,
which, of course, did not protect tbe freedom of contract; but
in the case of M'Millan v. M'Neill, decided in the same year,2 1
the court by way of dictum at least held that the contract clause
guaranteed freedom of contract. However, in the case of Ogden
v. Sauliders22 the court repudiated this dictum. This was the
one constitutional decision in which Chief Justice Marshall dis-
sented, and there were two others who dissented with him. Chief
Justice Marshall, if he could have had his way, would have writ-
ten into our Constitution at this time a guaranty of freedom of
contract. Thus, it was only by a narrow margin that freedom
of contract was not protected by the obligation of contracts
clause. This protection was undertaken too soon. Later on,
under the due process clause, of course, it obtained more pro-
tection than Marshall desired to give it under the contract
clause.
23
COMMERCE CI u sE
Another place where tb.e United States Supreme Court has
reservation of the power to amend, of not taking back a privilege (pro-
vided due process does not apply). 27 Ill. L. Rev. 908.
(1819), 4 Wheat. 122.
(1819), 4 Wheat. 209.
(1827), 12 Wheat. 213.
"Sharp, fovenwnt in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46 Harv. Law
Rev. 361, 36tF.
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come into touch with our capitalistic system has been in connec-
tion with the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
The commerce clause has operated to protect capitalism
from social control by the states. While capitalism has escaped
social control to a considerable extent because of the rivalry be-
tween different states, as in the case of exemption from income
taxation, liberal laws as to incorporation, and the absence of
child labor laws, on the whole, if the states were free to tax and
regulate corporations engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce, capitalism would probably have had more social control
from the states than it has had from the federal government,
where the states are inhibited from action, but action is per-
mitted to the federal government. In other words, there has
been more likelihood of the protection of property and the other
essential characteristics of our capitalistic system by the federal
government than there would have been by the states.
The states, by the original Constitution and Supreme Court
decisions, are denied any power over foreign commerce. They
cannot exercise any police power with reference to it and they
are prohibited from exercising a taxing power so long as goods
imported are in the original package.
24
In the matter of interstate commerce, also the states have
had very important limitations put upon their exercise of the
police power. At first, they were allowed more power than they.
were later allowed. While the United States Supreme Court
apparently at first took the position that the power over inter-
state commerce was a concurrent power,25 even then, after the
federal government had acted, of course, state regulation was
superseded. But in the course of time the United States Su-
preme Court held that where the subject of interstate commerce
was national in scope or admitted of only one uniform plan of
regulation, the power to regulate it was an exclusive power of
Congress and the states had no power, 20 and this exclusive power
of Congress extended so long as the goods were in the original
package.2 7 This, of course, placed very important limitations
upon any social control of interstate commerce by the states.
2'Brown v. Maryland (1827), 12 Wheat. 419.
SWilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), 2 Pet. 245.
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens (1851), 12 How. 299; Leisy v.
Hardin (189&), 135 U. S. 100.
2Austin v. Tennessee (1900), 179 U. S. 343.
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More recently the Supreme Court has allowed the states the
privilege of exercising a general police power for the purpose
of protecting some of the general social interests of the state,
even though such police power incidentally or indirectly regu-
lated interstate commerce. 28 But even now the Supreme Court
will not allow a state to take jurisdiction of a transitory cause
of action against a non-resident corporation not doing business
in the state. 29 Unified federal control favors corporations doing
business in a number of states, because it protects them against
the diversity (precedents) of social control in the many states.
So far as taxation is concerned, the Supreme Court has held
that the states must not tax interstate commerce, 30 but, for some
reason, the Supreme Court did not apply the original package
doctrine to interstate commerce so far as concerns taxation. As
a consequence a state may levy a tax upon goods while they are
still in the original package after they have come to rest in the
state.
31
So far as state action is concerned, therefore, both in the
matter of the police power and the matter of taxation, capitalism
has received protection against state action and therefore has
not received direction by state action.
Of course, where the federal government has protected
capitalism from state action, it, itself, has had the power to regu-
late and to tax both foreign commerce and interstate commerce.
It has taxed foreign commerce but it has not thus far taxed in-
terstate commerce. However, it has regulated interstate com-
merce to a considerable extent, and in so doing has, of course,
given more direction to capitalism than it has protection. In
that connection, it has regulated the liability of employers en-
gaged in interstate commerce,8 2 and the transportation of lottery
tickets,3 3 of women for immoral purposes, 3 4 and of impure food
-Plumley v. Massachusetts (1894), 155 U. S. 461; Plessy v. Fergu-
son (1896), 163 U. S. 537; Patapsco v. North Carolina (1898), 171 U. S.
345; Lake Shore, etc., Co. v. Ohio (1899), 173 U. S. 285; Minnesota
Rate Cases (1913), 230 U. S. 352.
"Davis v. Farmers, etc., Co. (1923), 262 U. S. 312.
10 Case of the State Freight Tax (1872), 15 Wall. 232.
3'Brown v. Houston (1885), 114 U. S. 622; Texas v. Brown (1922),
258 U. S. 466.
12Second Employers Liability Cases (1912), 223 U. S. 1.
"Lottery Cases (1903), 188 U. S. 321.
'Hoke v. Unitea States (1913), 227 U. S. 308.
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and drugs,35 in interstate commerce; and in regulating the rates
of railroads it has permitted the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to regulate the rates for intrastate commerce as well as in-
terstate commerce where interblended. 36 But more recently it
refused to uphold a child labor law prohibiting the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of products mined or manufactured
by establishments employing children under specified ages.37
So far as intrastate commerce is concerned, the states theo-
retically are given a free hand, but the states' power may have to
yield to federal power where interstate and intrastate commerce
are interblended and the states' power may be limited by other
clauses in the Constitution. Where such limitations occur the
state police power is limited, unless it can require the giving up
of such constitutional protection as a condition of a grant of
some privilege. Some constitutional limitations cannot thus
legally be relinquished. A state may not, for example, require
a corporation to agree not to remove to the federal courts suits
arising within the state, 38 nor assent to a tax which, unduly
burdens interstate commerce, 39 nor consent to a tax upon prop-
erty permanently situated outside the state,40 nor consent to be-
come a common carrier instead of a private carrier as a condi-
tion to the use of the public highways.41 But a state may require
a pipe line company to assume the duties of a common carrier as
a condition for the grant of eminent domain, 42 require a public
utility company, as a condition of obtaining a franchise, to bar-
gain away its right to object to confiscatory rates, 4 3 and require
a public utility, corporation, in return for its privilege, to make a
valid contract to continue in operation in spite of the fact that
but for the contract the Constitution would permit it to surren-
der is franchise and cease operation.4 4  In other words, the
states, through the exercise of their bargaining power, may ap-
16Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (1911), 220 U. S. 45; McDermott
v. Wisconsin (1913), 228 U. S. 115.
36Houston v. United States (1914), 234 U. S. 342.
"7Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), 247 U. S. 251.
"Terral v. Burke Constr. Co. (1922), 257 U. S. 529.
*Looney v. Crane Co. (1917), 245 U. S. 178.
41Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910), 216 U. S. 1.
" Frost v. R. R. Comm. of Calif. (1926), 271 U. S. 583.
42PIerce Oil Co. v. Phoenix Refin. Co. (1922), 259 U. S. 125.
"St. Cloud Pub. Serv. Co. v. St. Cloud (1924), 265 U. S. 352.
"Bullock v. Florida (1921), 254 U. S. 513; Transit Comm. v. United
States (1932), 284 U. S. 360.
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parently exercise some social control which would otherwise be
unconstitutional. In determining how far this bargaining power
may go, perhaps the safest generalization is that it will not be
allowed to be exercised where it will allow the states to encroach
either upon the federal government or upon another state gov-
ernment, but it will be allowed to be exercised where only the in-
terests of individuals are concerned.
45
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
Capitalism is, of course, protected by the original Consti-
tution against the taxation of its imports from or exports to a
foreign country by any of the states of the United States, and
against the taxation of exports to a foreign country by the
United States; and the Supreme Court has held that the states'
power of taxation of imports does not begin so long as the goods
imported are still in the original package.4 6 Of course, the
states' police power also cannot be exercised during this time.
Singularly, however, the states are permitted to tax goods ship-
ped in interstate commerce though they are still in the original
package after they have come to rest in the state, 47 although
the original package doctrine has been extended to interstate
commerce so far as concerns police power. 48
SLAVEws
There are a number of provisions in the original Constitu-
tion protecting the former slave owners in their property in
the slaves. In the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford , 4 9 the United
States Supreme Court undertook to solve the slavery problem
which then existed in the United States by extending even fur-
ther protection to the property of slave holders in their slaves
by holding that it was impossible for a slave to become a citizen
of the United States, but this decision was overruled by the
Civil War. However, although this particular kind of protee-
Harding, Taxation of Shares in Domestic Corporations, 27 Ill. L.
Rev. 894-898.
4Brown v. Maryland (1827), 12 Wheat. 419.
4"Brown v. Houston (1885), 114 U. S. 622.
48Austin v. Tennessee (1900), 179 U. S. 343.
0 (1857), 19 How. 393.
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tion of property was abolished, the general protection of prop-
erty continued.
INTERSTATE PRIVIIEES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
By the interstate privileges and immunities clause, each
state of the United States is required to give to the citizens of
every other state all the fundamental rights, powers, privileges
and immunities which it gives to its own citizens. This gives
important protection to the citizens of other states than the one
passing the laws.50 Yet, it has been held that a state, even under
this limitation, may make certain reasonable conditions as to re-
quire a bond as a condition for suit in the state courts,5 ' or as to
fishing in its waters for property which is really vested in the
state,5 2 and it may wholly deny the privilege of suing in its
state courts on the theory of forum non conveniens.5" A cor-
poration, however, has not as yet been given the protection of
the interstate privileges and immunities clause.
UNITED STATES PRIVIEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
period of the ascendency of Justice Miller and Chief Justice
Waite, the United States Supreme Court came very close to
putting a further limitation upon the powers of the state and
thereby indirectly further protecting the capitalistic system
under the clause forbidding a state's abridging "the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States." But by a vote
of five to four, the United States Supreme Court decided not to
take this action.5 4 In doing so, it limited the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States protected against
abridgement by the states to "those which owe their existence
to the federal government, its national character, its constitu-
tion, or its laws as distinguished from those of citizens of a
state, as, for example, the right of free access to seaports; pro-
"Blake v. Mclung (1898), 172 U. S. 239; Douglas v. New York
(1929), 279 U. S. 377.
"lOwnbey v. Morgan (1921), 256 U. S. 94.
" Corfield v. CorVell (1825), 4 Wash. C. C. 371.
5Rogers v. Guaranty Co. (1933), 53 S. Ct. 295; 46 Harv. L. Rev.
193.
Slaughter-House 'Cfases (1872), 16 Wall. 36; Civi7 Rights Cases
(1883), 109 U. S. 3.
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tection on the high seas; the right of assemblage and petition;
the right to sue in the federal courts; the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; the right to use navigable waters; the right to
become a citizen of any state by residence; and the privilege not
to have unequal tax laws." Justice Field and three of his asso-
ciates were strong dissenters. If the dissenting judges had had
their way, the privileges and immunities of United States citi-
zens might have included all the fundamental civil rights, both
those arising at common law and those given by the Constitu-
tion. In such case, of course, freedom of contract would have
been protected by the United States privileges and immunities
clause.
But again freedom of contract failed to receive the protec-
tion for which Justice Field and many other lawyers in the
United States were fighting. It had to wait for Justice Field to
come into the ascendency in th.e United States Supreme Court,
and to have the due process clause stretched to do the work for
which the Supreme Court refused to stretch the contract clause
and the United States privileges and immunities clause. Be-
fore this could be done, the due process clause had to be extended
to matters of substance, which was not until the nineties. How-
ever, in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold,"5 by a five to three
vote, the due process clause was prematurely extended to the
protection of matters of substance, so as to protect creditors
against the retroactive legislation found in the Legal Tender
Acts; but since this case was almost immediately overruled, it
will have to be disregarded in this discussion.
THE EQUALITY CLAUSE
The equality clause also has had some relation to the growth
of our capitalistic system. Of course, it has always been the
doctrine of the United States Supreme Court that the equality
clause forbade class legislation but did not prohibit classifica-
tion, which, of course, meant that before any classification could
be upheld the Supreme Court would have to be given, or find,
some reason for it. In the earlier history of the work of the
Supreme Court, the Court put a greater limitation upon legis-
lation and gave more protection to capitalism than it did later,
although there have been sporadic decisions contrary to these
- (1869), 8 Wall. 603.
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general tendencies all through our history. Thus, in the mat-
ter of the police power, it was held, in Gutf, etc., Co. v. Eflis,5 3
that it was not proper classification to put railways in one class
and all other persons in another class for the prompt payment
of small claims; but in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers,5
7 it
was held proper classification to put common carriers into one
class and all other persons into another class for a penalty for
the non-payment of claims when recovery in full was finally al-
lowed by the court. And in a number of other cases it has been
held that it is proper classification to put railways in one class
and all other persons in another class. 58 Again, it has been held
that it is not proper classification to put aliens in one class and
all other persons in another class for the purpose of licensing
the business of peddling,5 9 or for the purpose of employment
(in restaurants), ° but that it is proper classification to put
aliens in one class and all others in another class for the purpose
of operating poolrooms, 61 or for the purpose of owning land.
62
In the matter of taxation the Supreme Court early held it
proper classification to put into one class for a local assessment
the property especially benefitted and into another class all
oth.er property, but it at first held that there must be a very
definite relation between the amount of the assessment and the
amount of the special benefit. 6 " lore recently it has held that
there need be very little relation between the amount of the as-
sessment and the amount of the benefits. 4 In the case of Quaker,
etc., Company v. Pennsylvania, 5 the Supreme Court held that
it was not proper classification to put a corporation in one class
and all others in another for the taxi-cab business, but in State
Board of Indiana v. Jackson,6 it held it proper classification to
- (1897), 165 U. S. 150.
" (1907), 207 U. S. 73.
"'Atchison, etc., Company v. Matthews (1899), 174 U. S. 96; Mis-
souri, etc., Co. v. May (1904), 194 U. S. 267; Mobile, etc., Co. v. Turnip-
seed (1910), 219 U. S. 35.
" Commonwealth v. Hana (1907), 195 Mass. 262.
'Truax v. Raich (1915), 239 U. S. 33.
Ohio v. Deckebach (1927), 274 U. S. 392.
"Terrace v. Thompson (1923), 263 U. S. 197.
13Norwood v. Baker (1898), 172 U. S. 269.
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (1901), 181 U. S. 324;
Butters v. City of Oaklana (1923), 263 U. S. 162; Roberts v. Richland
(1933), 53 S. Ct. 519.
(1928), 277 U. S. 389.
(1931), 283 U. S. 527.
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put chain stores into one class and all others into another class
for the purpose of graduated license fees. Yet, it soon there-
after held that it was not proper classification to assess certain
property at one hundred per cent of its actual value and other
property at fifty per cent.
67
From these few illustrations, it is apparent that the equality
clause b as had some effect upon the development of our capital-
istic system in the United States. It has not necessarily impeded
its development, but it has more or less directed its development.
It has prevented governments from doing many things to inter-
fere with the capitalistic system, but it has also been quite liberal
in allowing the governments to proceed against various social
classes without proceeding against all.
DuE PROCESS CLAuS.
The great judicial control of the capitalistic system with
its emphasis upon property and freedom of contract and its
corporation technic has come through the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. What dissenting judges and
corporation lawyers tried to obtain through the contract clause
and the privileges and immunities clause and, to some extent, the
equality clause was at last finally achieved through the due
process clause. The one man who more than any other man was
entitled to the credit for this achievement was Justice Field of
the United States Supreme Court. He had an economic orien-
tation and almost occult prevision of capitalistic needs. Under
him capitalistic development weighted the judicial scales. But
the court chose business rather than agrarian interests. The
economic dogma was laissez faire which, led to monopoly. The
legal dogma was due process which led to laissez faire. In this
period, the work of the United States Supreme Court was cre-
ative, though perhaps not socially wise. Field's theory was de-
veloped and applied by the court to give positive direction to
capitalistic development. 68
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Freedom of contract is a rather recent notion. It is a phase
of Adam Smith's doctrine of laissez faire. As we have already
U* umberland Coa7 Co. v. Board of Revision (1931), 284 U. S. 23.
Swisher, Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Lam.
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seen, Marshall, of course, hinted at it. The cause or origin of the
notion is to be found in the individualistic justice which for-
merly obtained in Anglo-American law, a justice which empha-
sized property and contract, mechanical jurisprudence, thbe juris-
prudential concepts of the state and economics, the tyranny of
the judges, natural law, and the division of law from the facts,
and forgot the early labor legislation.6 9 It had a peculiar appeal
to Justice Field, who, as a Puritan and a Frontiersman, would
naturally believe in this sort of individualism. His position was
eloquently presented in the case of Butchers' Union, etc., Co. v.
The Crescent City, etc., Co., 70 in which case he used his own
dissenting argument in the Slaughter-House cases, 71 to the effect
that there are certain inherent rights of individuals, like liveli-
hood and freedom of contract, which, are beyond the exercise of
public authority. This argument affected later state decisions
and finally the United States Supreme Court decision in Lochner
v. New York.
72
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause
found in the Fifth Amendment was rarely invoked, but the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has brought more
business to the United States Supreme Court than any other part
of the Constitution, and by virtue of it the Supreme Court has
exercised a power perhaps never before exercised by a legal
tribunal. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has given the United States Supreme Court power over the
states; the Fifth Amendment, power over the federal govern-
ment. Otherwise, the clauses have the same scope.
LEGAL PROCEDURE
At first, the Supreme Court applied the due process clause
only to matters of procedure,7 3 and it intimated that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was only a pro-
O'Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. Jour. 454.
'o (1884), 111 U. S. 746.
11 (1872), 16 Wall. 36.
7 (1905), 198 U. S. 45. This case has now been impliedly over-
ruled and many other limitations placed on freedom of contract, as,
for example, by making voidable any settlement of a personal injury
claim within thirty days after the date of injury to stop ambulance
chasing, etc. 31 Mich. L. Rev. 847.
"Bank of Columbia v. Okely (1819), 4 Wheat. 235; Munn v. Illi-
nois (1876), 94 U. S. 113.
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tection to the negroes as a class.7 4 But, of course, the protection
of the due process clause, so far as it concerns legal procedure,
was soon extended to natural persons. As time went on, it at
first seemed as though the Supreme Court was going to be more
and more liberal as to what would amount to due process of law
as a matter of procedure and the court upbeld new forms of
legal procedure like information instead of indictment,7 5 and a
jury of eight instead of a jury of twelve,70 for to hold otherwise
the court said "would be to deny every quality of the law but
its age."
Such a tendency would have given more limitation than
protection to our capitalistic system, but in subsequent develop-
ments of the requirements of due process so far as concerns
legal procedure, the Supreme Court has placed its limits on so-
cial control more than upon capitalism. It has now, for one
thing, been established that due process of law as a matter of
p'rocedure requires an impartial tribunal always,7 7 and wbhere a
question of jurisdiction or a question of fundamental sub-
stance is involved, whether it is a question of fact or law, a
judicial tribunal;78 and in such case, the Supreme Court has
held that a trial de novo must be granted3 9 For another thing,
it has now been established that jurisdiction is required, al-
though now, apparently, jurisdiction may be based on alle-
giance,80 and on either consent or propriety and convenience. 8 '
Due process of law, as a matter of legal procedure, also requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a few small excep-
tions as in tbhe case.of poll taxes and the destruction of property
of trifling value.8 2 Notice, to be sufficient, must apprise the de-
fendant of the nature of the proceeding and afford him a suffi-
cient opportunity to answer but notice on the Secretary of
"S*laughter-House Cases (1872), 16 Wall. 36; Strauder v. West
Virginia (1880), 100 U. S. 303.
'5Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516.
76Maxwell v. Dow (1900), 176 U. S. 581.
17 Tumey v. Ohio (1927), 273 U. S. 510.
8hio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920), 253 U. S.
287; 21 Calif. Law Rev. 266.
19 Crowell v. Benson, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 478; 41 Yale L. Jour. 1037;
80 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 1055.
"Blackner v. United States (1932), 284 U. S. 421; 30 Mich. L. Rev.
137.
, Rogers v. Guaranty Co. (1933), 53 S. Ct. 295; 81 Univ. of Pa. IL.
Rev. 635; 17 Minn. L. Rev. 146; 31 Col. L. Rev. 679.
12Lawton v. Steele (1894), 152 U. S. 133.
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State, provided notice is also mailed is sufficient wherever juris-
diction can be acquired by consent or under the doctrine of pro-
priety and convenience.8 3 Opportunity to be heard requires a
fair chance to present one's case at some stage in the proceed-
ings to some governmental tribunal, and, in the case indicated
above, before a judicial tribunal without the imposition of oner-
ous conditions.8 4 Due process of law also requires an orderly
course of procedure. This does not mean procedure sanctioned
by settled usage, although, of course this is valid,8 5 for new
methods of procedure are as much due process as old methods,80
and it does not include jury trial8 7 nor protection against testi-
fying against oneself,88 nor a correct decision;89 but it does
require that the tribunal must be honest,OA not dominated by a
mob, 0 that a person shall not be denied or hindered access to the
courts, 1 and that he shall have the right to counsel.9 2 Due
process, as a matter of procedure, applies as a limitation on ad-
ministrative tribunals 3 and upon judicial tribunals,9 4 but not
upon legislative tribunals,9 5 and to any agency of the govern-
ment, as to a political party where it is performing a govern-
mental function.96
SUBSTANCE
The direction given to our capitalistic system by the United
States Supreme Court under due process as a matter of legal
procedure has been, however, nothing as compared to the di-
1 Wuchter v. Pizzutti (1928), 276 U. S. 13.
8 Anthony v. Syracuve University (1927), 223 N. Y. S. 796; Ownbey
v. Morgan (1921), 256 U. S. 94.
wHardware Dealers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. (1931), 284
U. S. 151.
" Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516.
8 TJordan v. Massachusetts (1912), 225 U. S. 167; 6 N. Car. L. Rev.
77.
"Twining v. New Jersey (1908), 211 U. S. 78.
C0 entral Land Co. v. Laidley (1895), 159 U. S. 103.
"A Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley (1896), 164 U. S. 112.
"Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309; Moore v. Dempsey
(1923), 261 U. S. 86.
"Ex parte Young (1908), 209 U. S. 123.
"Powell v. Alabama (1932), 53 S. Ct. 55.
"Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (1932), 286 U. S. 461; 80 Univ. of
Pa. L. Rev. 96, 878.
"Baldwin v. Iowa, etc., Assoc. (1931), 283 U. S. 522.
"Norwegian, etc., Co. v. United States (1933), 53 S. Ct. 350; 33
Col. L. Rev. 528.
"Nixon v. Condon (1932), 286 U. S. 73; 21 Cal. L. Rev. 62.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
rection it has given to it under due process as a matter of sub-
stance. For long years after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the majority of the Supreme Court refused to ex-
tend the due process clause to matters of substance. Of course,
Justice Field and some of his associates dissented and in the
course of time the dissenting judges came into power in the
United States Supreme Court. The extension of the due process
clause to matters of substance has an interesting history. It per-
haps had its origin in Coke's dictum, that there are certain
fundamental principles of the common law which are paramount
over legislation.91 Before the United States Supreme Court
thought of extending due process to matters of substance it did
intimate that it would set aside, and in three cases actually did
set aside, legislation because in violation of what Coke called
the fundamental principles of the common law.98 Finally, in
the case of Davidson v. New Orleans,99 the Supreme Court
merged Coke's dictum with due process of law and thus extended
due process of law to the protection of matters of substance, and
since that time this case has been followed in a long line of
cases; and in the nineties, as a result of the triumph of Justice
Field and his associates, the protection of due process as a matter
o4 substance was extended to the property rights of corpora-
tions.10 0 It has been contended that this protection against so-
cial control applies only against the legislative branches of gov-
ernment, but it would seem that if the protection of due process
is to be extended at all to matters of substance, it should be ex-
tended against all the various branches of government.' 0 1
IT Dr. Bonham's Case (1610), 8 Co. 118a; overruled by Lee v. Bude,
etc., By. (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 582.
"Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck (1S10), 6
Cranch 87, 135; Terrett, et al. v. Taylor, et al. (1815), 9 Cranch 43, 50;
Wilkinson v. Leland (1829), 2 Pet. 627, 657; Webster v. Reid (1851),
11 How. 437, 140; Pacific Mail gti. Co. (1854), 17 How 596; Loan
Assn. v. Topeka (1875), 20 Wall. 655, 662; 6 Wis. L. Rev. 67.
(1877), 96 U. S. 97.
1' Hurtado v. California (1883), 110 U. S. 516; Santa Clara Co. v.
Southern Pao. R. Co. (1886), 118 U. S. 394; Minneapolis Ry. Co. v.
Beckwith (1889), 129 U. S. 26; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Minnesota. etc.,
Com. (1890), 134 U. S. 418; Scott v. Me~cal (1894), 154 U. S. 34;
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1894), 154 U. S. 362; "tloving-
ton v. Sanford (1896), 164 U. S. 578; C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago (1897),
166 U. S. 226, 241; Dewey v. Des Moines (1899), 173 U. S. 193; Roller
v. Holly (1900), 176 U. S. 398.
201 Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago (1897), 166 U. S. 226: Ex parte
Virginia (1879), 100 U. S. 339.
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"While Field succeeded permanently in extending the due
process clause to matters of substance and temporarily in pro-
tecting rather than limiting the property rights of corporations,
he could not permanently dominate the attitude of the Supreme
Court, and consequently, we find the Court sometimes protecting
and sometimes limiting such rights.
PU3LIC UTILITIES
In the case of Munn v. Illinois,10 2 perhaps as a result of the
Granger Movement, the United States Supreme Court put some
very important limitations upon our capitalistic system as it
had then developed. In that case, the United States Supreme
Court applied to all of those businesses which it. classified as busi-
nesses affected with a public interest the law called the law of
public callings, which had been developed in the period of equity
but which had in the period of maturity been more or less
superseded by the law of contracts and the rule of freedom of
contract. According to this law of public callings, any business
affected with a public interest was held bound to serve every-
body of the class of service with reasonably adequate facilities
without discrimination and for reasonable compensation. This
apparently threatened to give a new and very different direction
to a large part of our corporate and business development in the
United States, and it certainly gave the United States Supreme
Court the power to say both what business and what govern-
ment could do with respect to businesses affected with a public
interest. But in subsequent cases, the United States Supreme
Court limited the test of virtual monopoly for determining when
a business is affected with a public interest to the test of a vir-
tual monopoly in an indispensable service,' 0 3 and it adopted as
the bases for determining what is reasonable compensation a net
rate of return of as high as seven or eight per cent'0 4 and a rate
base very largely tied up with reproduction cost.' 0 5 As a result
of its emphasis upon reproduction cost, the practical effect of
1" (1876), 94 U. S. 113.
" Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923), 262
U. S. 522; Tyson v. Banton (1927), 273 U. S. 418; Tagg Brothers v.
United States (1930), 280 U. S. 420; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann
(1932), 285 U. S. 262.
I" Bluefteld Water Works v. Public Serv. Cor. (1923), 262 U. S. 679;
United Railways Co. of Baltimore v. West (1930), 280 U. S. 234.
1 5McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co. (1926), 272 U. S. 400; St.
Louis and O'Fallon Ry. Co., et al. v. United' States (1929), 279 U. S. 461
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the decisions of the United States Supreme Court has been to
give the public utilities since the World War a rate base about
twice what they prudently invested in the business. This was
largely due to the deflation of our currency, and inflation might
tend to have the opposite effect. As a result of the adoption of the
high rate of return, a rate of return almost twice what businesses
of like stability have to pay for money borrowed, the public utili-
ties have indulged in high finance and created holding com-
panies to such an extent as almost to defeat the purpose of gov-
ernmental regulation of public utilities.10 6 However, very re-
cently the United States Supreme Court has seemed to take a
position more favorable to social control and less favorable to
public utilities. In the case of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co. 10 7 the Supreme Court held that commissions in regulating
the rates of public utilities might consider the relation which
the local public utility had with holding companies, and in the
case of Stephenson v. Binford,0° it held that private contract
carriers might be required to take out certificates of convenience
and necessity and that their charges might be regulated. This
case either overruled the cases holding that a private carrier
could not be made a common carrier because it would be a viola-
tion of the due process clause,' 0 9 or the cases holding that it was
not due process of law to apply this form of social control out-
side of businesses affected with a public interest,110 or held that
private contract carriers could be made public callings but not
common carriers, when, of course, no earlier cases would have to
be overruled. But whatever the rationalization of this case, the
Supreme Court has authorized the application of social control
to private contract carriers in such a way as they have never had
it before.
HOURS OF LABOR
In the case of Holden v Hardy,"' the United States Su-
preme Court thought the social interest in health sufficient to
warrant the limitation of hours to eight for men employed to
VoWillis: SociaZ Control of Businesses Affected with a Public In-
terest, 20 Ind. Univ. Alumni Quarterly 1-14.
" (1930), 282 U. S. 133.
10 (1932), 53 S. Ct. 181.
x Frost, etc., Go. v. commission of California (1926), 271 U. S.
583; BSmith v. Calhoon (1931), 283 U. S. 553.
=Williams v. Standard Oil Go. (1929), 278 U. S. 235.
I (1898), 169 U. S. 366.
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work in underground mines, and in Atkin v. Kansas,"12 it held
that the limiting of the number of hours of employees working
on public work was valid. Wh.en the personnel of the court was
slightly reconstituted, a new alignment of the members of the
court, by a five to four decision, 118 held that there was not suffi-
cient interest in health to warrant limiting the hours of labor
of employees in bakeries to ten hours a day. Then the state
courts held that ten hour day laws for children under sixteen
were constitutional, 114 although the United States Supreme
Court later held a federal child labor law under the interstate
commerce clause was unconstitutional because it invaded the
jurisdiction of the state under our dual form of government,"r 5
and a federal child labor law under the taxing power unconsti-
tutional because Congress does not have the power to regulate
in the guise of taxation. 116 And once again the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Muller v. Oregon,117 held that it was
reasonable to regulate the hours of labor for women in mechani-
cal establishments, factories, or laundries; and, finally, in Bunt-
ing v. Oregon,"8 that it was reasonable to regulate the hours
of men in mills, factories, or manufacturing establishments.
Thus, the Supreme Court at last, apparently, placed rather sub-
stantial limitations upon the freedom of the capitalistic system.
MIN UM WAGES
But the social control of the capitalistic system permitted
under the decisions on hours of labor has been more apparent
than real. So long as the wages of employees are not regulated,
the regulation of the hours of labor is not especially significant.
The United States Supreme Court at first seemed inclined to
uphold the regulation of wages. In the case of McLean v.
Arkansas,1 8A it upheld a statute making it a crime for a mine
employing ten men to use a screen to reduce wages paid. In
1n (1903), 191 U. S. 207.
2"Lochner v. New York (1905), 198 U. S. 45.
n'State v. Shorey (1906), 48 Ore. 396.
'Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), 247 U. S. 251.
"Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Go. (1922), 259 U. S. 20.
n(1908), 208 U. S. 412.
" (1917), 243 U. S. 426.
2A (1909), 211 U. S. 539.
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Wilson v. New,l1sB it upheld the federal Adamson Act perma-
nently applying an eight-hour standard for work and wages
which had been in existence on about fifteen per cent of the rail-
roads, and in the case of Stettler v. O'Hara,119 by an evenly di-
vided court, the Supreme Court upheld a minimum wage law.
But in the case of Adkins v. Chsldren's Hospital, 20 the Supreme
Court finally and definitely held that an act of Congress pro-
viding for minimum wages for women and minors in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was unconstitutional because there was no
sufficient social interest to warrant such a limitation of the per-
sonal liberty of business men. Perhaps the better explanation
for this decision is the United States' taboo against price fixing,
which was evidently stronger than any social interest in health.
However, in the recent case of O'Gorman and Young v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co.,121 the Supreme Court held that it was consti-
tutional to regulate the wages of insurance brokers, so that it
appears that the unconstitutionality of minimum wage legisla-
tion is not entirely foreclosed.
LABOR LEGISLATION
In the case of Adair v. United States,1 22 the Supreme Court
held that the right of freedom of contract could not be abridged
by legislation making it unlawful to threaten an employee with
loss of employment because of membership in a labor union, and
in the case of Coppage v. the State of Kansas, 23 that the right
to require the so-called "yellow-dog" contracts could not be
limited. But in the case of Texas, etc., Co. v. Brotherhood,
eCe.,124 it upheld the provision as to collective bargaining found
in the Railroad Labor Act of 1926. These decisions would indi-
cate that at first the Supreme Court's position was one to pro-
tect the capitalistic system, but that now it is beginning to as-
sume a position where it would limit the freedom of the capital-
istic system.
(To be concluded in the M\Iay, 1934, issue of the
Kentucky Law Journal)
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